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 The purpose of this project report is to educate, and provide a basic overview the 
current budgetary financial reporting practices within Commander Naval Air Pacific as it 
pertains to the Flight Hour Program (FHP) and Flight hour Other (FO) program and 
explore how to improve the budget/costs estimation and execution process.  Proper 
execution of appropriated funds is critical if the Navy hopes to maximize the 
optimization of their limited resources.  Today Commander Naval Air Forces faces many 
challenges in leading our Naval Air Force in the war on terror.  Facing the same 
budgetary uncertainty issues year after year should not be one of them.  Budget/cost 
estimations are in need of an overhaul.  It must be overhauled to stop the vicious cycle of 
under funding and “buy back” (due to withholds, reprogramming, and/or bow-waving) of 
what should have been the previous years over obligations.   
 The project report introduces the DoD budget process, the Flight Hour program 
(FHP), Flight Hour Other (FO) program, and there budget and execution processes.  It 
introduces Process Engineering and viable information technology solutions (web 
enabled Database and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems) as tools that could 
be used in an effort to overhaul budget requirement, allocation, and managing process.  I 
led a team on an exercise in process improvement in a class (IS-4220) in which the focus 
was process improvement with information technology.  The excerpts from our findings 
and recommendations are compelling regarding the need for change within the CNAP 
comptroller’s office.  Lastly, the project report will close with the suggestion of the need 
for a template or roadmap as to the feasibility weather process improvement through 
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II. DoD BUDGETING: RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS (RAP) 
 Resource allocation is the process in which financial resources are made available 
to all federal agencies.  Knowledge of this process provides a foundation from which 
Navy Flight Hour Program Managers can begin to understand the many challenges faced 
in “resourcing” the program, as well as to help identify some of the inherent problems in 
the RAP.  Resources for all activities in the Department of Defense whether weapons, 
personnel, or infrastructure and maintenance, are provided through the RAP.  There are 
four phases of the RAP: 
¾ Phases I:  Planning, Programming, and Budgeting and Execution System 
(PPBES)  
¾ Phase II:  Enactment 
¾ Phase III:  Apportionment 
¾ Phase IV:  Execution 
A. PHASE I:  PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING AND 
EXECUTION SYSTEM (PPBES) 
 The PPBES is the process that ultimately produces the DoD portion of the 
President’s Budget.  The process originally introduced to DoD in 1962 by Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara and last modified by Donald Rumsfeld in 2003 provides a 
formal and systematic framework designed to assist the Secretary of Defense in making 
policy and strategy decisions, and the development of forces and capabilities to 
accomplish required missions.  The objective of PPBES is to translate national security 
interests into military missions and construct budgetary requirements to be presented to 
Congress for funding consideration.  This action attempts to outfit military operational 
commanders with the “best” mix of equipment, forces and support, within the confines of 
limited resources available.  A model depicting PPBES is shown below:  
 
Figure 1 Revised Navy PPBES Process (From: Jones, 2003, P. 126) 
 
 PPBS was renamed in 2003 as the PPBES process with the added E for execution.  
The major changes were intended to provide military departments and services greater 
flexibility to: 
1. Respond effectively to changing threats, and  
2. The ability to move resources more rapidly, and  
3. To put new weapons systems in the field more quickly.   
In 2003 under SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, significant changes were made to the PPBS 
system.  It was renamed the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 
(PPBES).  While basic structure of the PPBS remained unaltered, it was changed in three 
important ways. First, the reform merged separate programming and budget review into a 
single review cycle.  Second, it incorporated a biennial budget process.  Third, it changed 
 4
 5
the cycle for OSD provision of the top level planning information to the military 
departments and services. (Jones, 2003) 
 It is important to note the general acceptance of the changes to the PPBS.  The 
PPBES cycle timing changes were sensible given that new administrations rarely have 
the people in place or the insights necessary to put programs in place and prepare budget 
initiatives in the early days of an administration.  Thus, designating the First year for 
review of national security strategy and the work on the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) sets the scene for a complete budget build in the second year.  Designating the off 
years as years of minimal change, but allowing mechanisms for changes that do need to 
be made separately in program change proposals and budget change proposals, also 
seems sensible and should cut down the turmoil involved in a complete POM-Budget 
rebuild each year.  (Jones, 2003) 
 The last changes to the PPBES in 2003 led to reform that ordered DoD to move 
from an annual program objective memorandum and Budget Estimate Submission (BES) 
cycle to a biennial (2-year) cycle, beginning with an abbreviated review and amendment 
cycle for FY2005.  Under the revised process, DoD will formulate 2-year budgets and use 
the off year to focus on fiscal execution and program performance.  The 2-year 
programming and budgeting cycle is designed to guide DoD strategy development, 
identification of needs for military capabilities, program planning, resource estimation 
and allocation, acquisition, and other decision processes.  This change was intended to 
more closely align the DoD internal PPBES cycle with external requirements embedded 
in statute and administration policy, including the QDR as amended. (Jones, 2003, 132) 
 Under the new system, the QDR is intended to continue to serve as the major 
DoD statement of defense strategy and policy.  This distinction is noteworthy as it 
reflects the revolution in business affairs initiative undertaken in DoD in the late 1990s 
and continued into the new millennium.  And, from the OSD perspective, the QDR also 
constitutes the single link throughout DoD to integrate and influence all internal decision 
processes, for example, preparation of the FYDP and DPG. Section 922 of Public Law 
107-314, the “Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,” 
amended section 118 of Title 10 of the United States Code to align the QDR submission 
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date with that of the President's budget in the second year of an administration, as noted 
earlier.  As a result of the 2003 process modification, the off-year defense planning 
guidance (DPG) will be issued at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.  The off-year 
DPG will no longer introduce major changes to the defense program, except as 
specifically directed by the DoD Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.  As noted 
previously in this chapter, DoD announced that no DPG would be issued in 2003 for 
FY2005. (Jones, 2003, P. 133) 
 In addition, rather than preparing the POM during the off year, according to the 
reform, DoD will use program change proposals to accommodate real world changes, and 
as part of the continuing need to align the defense program with the defense strategy.  
DoD will use budget change proposals (BCPs) instead of a budget estimate submission 
(BES) during the off year. BCPs will accommodate fact-of-life changes including cost 
increases, schedule delays, management reform savings, and workload changes as well as 
changes resulting from Congressional action.  The FY2005 execution reviews will 
provide opportunity to make assessments of current and previous resource allocations and 
evaluate the extent to which DoD had achieved its planned performance goals. 
Performance metrics, including the OMB program assessment rating tool (PART) used in 
the Bush administration in the 2000s may provide the analytical underpinning to ascertain 
whether an appropriate allocation of resources exists in current budgets.  To the extent 
performance goals of an existing program are not being met, recommendations may be 
made to replace that program with alternative solutions or to make appropriate funding 
adjustments to correct resource imbalances.  This reform demonstrates how DoD will 
comply with the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 
as enforced by OMB. PART ratings and transmission of the QDR to Congress are 
intended to satisfy GPRA requirements for DoD. 
 It is important to point out that in the past and presently, input to program and 
budget decisions in DoD is provided by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and staff, the 
position in DoD that bears a large part of the responsibility for actually attempting to 
manage the DoD. In addition, the Under Secretary Comptroller, the Under Secretary for 
Acquisition, Transportation, and Logistics, and Assistant Secretaries for other OSD 
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functional areas including program analysis and evaluation, policy, force management 
and personnel, legislative affairs, health, reserve affairs, and others, all provide views and 
analyses to guide program and budget decision-making. 
 The PPBS assesses U.S. security threats, develops a strategic plan to address 
threats and develops requirements to support that strategy. Requirements are then 
translated into specific DoD programs developed to execute that strategy and ultimately 
create budgets to deliver program funding.  The PPBS consists of three phases to achieve 
its objective. They are: 1) The Planning Phase, 2) The Programming Phase, and 3) The 
Budgeting Phase.  Planning addresses the capabilities required to carry out the U.S. 
national military security strategy and the resources available for defense.  Programming 
translates the results of DoD planning into a logical six-year defense program within 
available resources. Budgeting converts the program into the congressional appropriation 
structure, focusing on building justifiable budgets while ensuring compliance with high 
level guidance from the President and Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
 
Figure 2 Phases and Outputs of PPBS (From: Keating, 1998, P. 19) 
 1. Planning 
 The planning phase begins with a review of national security objectives and ends 
with development of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).  The Under Secretary 
Defense (USD) for Policy along with Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), The Office of Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) and numerous high-level military and defense agencies evaluate the 
national security objectives, the posture of the United States, and the military’s capability 
to support those objectives.  Their focus in planning is to: 
¾ Define the National Military strategy needed to maintain U.S. security and 
support U.S. foreign policy 2 to 7 years in the future. 
¾ Plan military force structure necessary to accomplish that strategy. 
¾ Develop a comprehensive framework and roadmap for DoD that combines 
priorities and missions within fiscal resource limitations. 
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¾ Provide decision options to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to help him 
assess the role of national defense in the formulation of national security policy 
and related decisions. 
 The output of the planning phase includes two documents, the National Military 
Strategy Document (NMSD) and the DPG. The NMSD builds on the President’s security 
objectives, identifies strategy, provides advice to the President, and is the input basis for 
the DPG.  It is important to note that the NMSD is not fiscally constrained. 
After a series of reviews is completed, a draft DPG is published and the unified 
force commanders are given the opportunity to provide inputs and recommendations.  
This provides each of the services with a flavor of the strategic priorities and their roles in 
future years.  The DPG is the first output document in the planning process that is fiscally 
constrained and guides the services in developing their programs for a six-year period. As 
explained by McCaffery and Jones, “The Guidance indicates annularly the assets, forces, 
and other resources needed to satisfy U.S. security objectives.”  The DPG provides the 
basis for subsequent service - branch and OSD programming and budgeting” (Jones, 
2003, P. 108) when finalized, the DPG is signed by the SECDEF, which indicates the 
planning process is completed and the programming phase begins.  Figure 3 shows an 
overview of the Planning process.(Keating, 1998, P. 15) 
 
 
Figure 3 PPBS Planning Process (From: Keating, 1998, P. 15) 
 
2. Programming 
 PPBS brings together long-term strategic planning with the programming process.  
The programming process is the procedure for distributing available resources equitably 
across many competing DoD programs (Keating, 1998, P. 15).  Programming translates 
planning efforts into a 6-year fiscal program for forces, manpower, and material.  
Programming begins with the issuance of the draft DPG in the beginning of the budget 
cycle, and ends with the submission of each service’s Program Objectives Memorandum 
(POM) to OSD, in mid-summer.  The POM is each communities and ultimately, services 
plan laying out the resources needed to their tasking (programs and missions) over the 
next six years. Every two years during the even years, the POM is updated to reflect: 1) 
new missions, 2) new objectives, 3) alternative solutions, 4) allocation of the resources, 
5) ongoing DoD activities and 6) the forecasted costs of each program.  For the Navy, the 
POM is the SECNAV’s recommendation to the SECDEF on the best use of the assets and 
resources allocated to the Navy. (Keating, 1998, P. 15) 
3. Budgeting 
 The final phase of the PPBS process is the budgeting phase.  The purpose of the 
budgeting phase is to allocate dollars to the DoD programs approved in the PPBS 
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framework.  PPBS budget formulation as pointed out by Jones and Bixler has five 
elements: 1) issuing budget preparation guidance, 2) estimating specific program costs, 3) 
holding hearings to justify budget submissions, 4) ensuring submissions adhere to “both 
policy and financial guidelines”, and finally, 5) the series of negotiations that take place 
to achieve the requested amount of program dollars projected to be available for the next 
two fiscal years and four out years (Keating, 1998, P. 16)  Formulation begins when 
OMB issues Circular A-11 to all federal agencies.  The A-11 provides general guidelines, 
instructions and schedules for budget submission (Keating, 1998, P. 16).  When DoD 
receives the A-11, each service formulates its own policy guidance document, which 
provides more detailed budgeting guidance. For the Navy, this is known as the Navy 
Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) Notice 7111 and is issued by the Navy’s Office of Budget 
(FMB).  This notice provides Navy resource sponsors detailed budget formulation 
guidance, forecasted inflation rates, deadlines for submission, and dollar limits for each 
budget year (called “control numbers”).  This signals the beginning of the budget process, 
commonly known as the “budget call”.  Upon receipt of this policy guidance, each 
service constructs detailed budget estimate submissions (BESs) based on the Program 
Decision Memoranda (PDM) and forwards their budget request in September to OSD.  
These BESs are reviewed by each of the respective service’s financial managers (FM) 
and are forwarded to the USD Comptroller for review and modification.  Final decisions 
on the respective services BESs are made via Program Budget Decisions (PBDs).  Once 
changes are made and approved, the BESs are then submitted as “the DoD budget” to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for incorporation into the President’s Budget 
(PB) for submission to Congress in February. 
During the budget review process, cost estimates in the POM are updated with the 
latest pricing information, funding shortfalls are addressed and budget exhibits are 
prepared to justify dollar requirements.  As the budget exhibits are submitted through the 
chain of command, a formal review process is initiated.  The review process includes 
budget reviews held at FMB, followed by a review at OSD, and finally a joint 
OSD/Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review.  This joint review is done to 
ensure the DoD budget supports the national security strategy.  During the review 
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process, budget analysts hold hearings to review and carefully scrutinize each budget line 
item submitted.  The analysts can take three courses of action: 1) approve exhibits as 
presented, 2) disapprove portions of exhibits by issuing a “mark” or 3) approve additional 
funds where shortfalls are detected. In the current budget environment, “marks” are by 
far the most common budget review actions taken within DoD.  If an item is marked, the 
sponsor of the budget is given 48-72 hours to question the marks by submitting a 
“reclama”. No’s Reclamas are detailed appeals to the marks made by the budget analyst 
and explain the impact of any invalid assumptions made by the analysts.  If no’s reclamas 
are approved, the marks are removed.  If not, the marks “stand” and the budgeted line 
item is reduced.  Naturally, this process is somewhat subjective and it is important to note 
that budget analysts represent part of the checks and balance mechanism within the 
budget process.  Their role and job is to apply DoD and congressional resource policy 
guidance to the various budget requests submitted.  Since the budgeting environment is 
constrained by the availability of limited resources, budget analysts are tasked to ensure 
budget authority is provided to the most needed and defensible programs (Keating, 1998, 
P. 17). 
B. PHASE II: ENACTMENT 
 
 Figure 4 Resource Allocation Process (From: UNK, 2003, P. 64) 
 
 Enactment is the process in which Congress reviews the President's Budget, 
conducts hearings and passes legislation.  The process begins when the President submits 
the annual budget to Congress in February and is concluded when the President signs the 
Annual Authorization and Appropriation bills normally prior to October Authorization 
legislation validates each of the Federal agencies programs and operations and specifies 
the maximum funding amount to be made available.  The appropriations process creates 
the budget authority, which permits each federal agency to incur obligations throughout 
the year (UNK, 2003, P. 68). 
C. PHASE III: APPORTIONMENT 
 After the President signs the authorization and appropriation legislation into law, 
funds are made available for DoD and other federal agencies.  Apportionment occurs 
when OMB provides the funds to the agencies. Funds are distributed throughout DoD 
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from the USD Comptroller to each service's comptroller and ultimately to the end user 
(Keating, 1998, P. 20) 
D. PHASE IV: EXECUTION 
 Execution consists of first gaining permission to spend, appropriations through 
the allotment process.  DoD will show congress how it intends to spend the money during 
the allotment process.  Subsequently, execution occurs when appropriated funds are 
obligated and spent (outlayed) by the authorized agencies.  An obligation is a legal 
commitment to provide funds to pay for services, weapons systems, or the awarding of 
contracts.  Expending funds occurs when the “check” is written and cashed.  Outlay 
(transfer) occur when government checks are cashed and the US. Treasury makes a 
payment. (UNK, 2003, P. 68)  
 
 
Figure 5 Resource Allocation Process – Overlap (From: UNK, 2003, P. 69) 
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 Execution is a critical part of the new PPBES.  The new process provides OSD a 
greater opportunity to examine and critique the budget execution decisions of its military 
services.  A recent twist to the budget execution review was a change initiated by the 
Bush administration in February of 2003 directing the DoD Comptroller to implement a 
“performance-based budgeting” that focuses on costs of achieving outcomes rather than 
the details of program administration and production (Jones, 2003, P. 106) 
 This concludes the discussion of DoD’s budgeting process.  The process is 
complicated and not easily understood.  Also, it is further complicated by the political 
nature of congressional oversight and interest in management of DoD’s spending.  It is 
critical that program managers and acquisition specialists understand and are up to date 
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III. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM (FHP) CASH MANAGEMENT AT 
COMMANDER NAVAL AIR FORCES PACIFIC (CNAP) 
 
 
Figure 6 DoD FHP Financial Organizational and Resource Allocation Flow (From: 





 The FHP represents more than 3.2 billion of the Navy’s FY2000 O&M, N 
appropriation.  Stringent budgets and limited resources have left program managers with 
difficult decisions in budget execution, attempting to satisfy operational requirements 
with scarce dollars.  There are two main chain of commands exist regarding the FHP 
program.  The operational chain (depicted below) gives direction for the daily mission 
tasking for all Navy and Marine Corps aircraft.  The chain illustrates the flow of authority 
from the President to the squadron commander.  Organizations within the operational 
chain provide input for consideration in budget formulation, but have a minimal role in 
formal budget development.   
B. FINANCIAL BUDGET PROCESS  
 The financial chain (depicted below) illustrates the flow of the FHP budget 
process.  The primary FHP budget exhibit is the Operational Plan 20 (OP-20).  N78 
constructs the necessary FHP budget exhibits and works closely throughout the year with 
the Major Claimants (like CINCPACFLT, CNAP).  The major claimants ensure ensures 
necessary budget inputs are received along with the appropriate justification.  The chart 
also displays the aforementioned budget inputs in relation to the financial organization.  
The three input mechanisms used at the squadron, air station, and N-78F levels are: 
1.  Budget OPTAR Report (BOR), 
2.  Flight Hour Cost Report (FHCR), 
3.  and the Operation Plan (OP-20). 
 The BOR and FHCR are the primary financial management inputs used at CNAP 
to administer and track FHP obligations during the fiscal year.  These reports collectively 
form the data used by N-78F to build the new OP-20 Budget exhibits.  CNAP has 2 
primary roles in the budget formulation process.  1) collecting and reporting FHP 
execution data , 2) developing FHP program and budget submissions.  (Jones, 2001, P. 
426) 
C. BUDGET ALLOCATION 
 CNAP is the focal point for allocating, executing and monitoring flight hour 
funding for all Navy and Marine Corps Pacific fleet squadrons.  Their primary goal and 
responsibility during allocation and execution is to achieve a specific level of readiness 
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for each squadron within the constraints of the resources available. (Jones, 2001, P. 426)  
At the start of the new Fiscal Year (FY), the FMB distributes quarterly Operating Budget 
(OB) allocations of the approved FHP funding to CNAP.  In theory, the FHP OB should 
provide the necessary dollars to execute CNAP’s flying mission.  However this is never 
the case, with restricted DoD budgets and competing priorities financial resources are 
scarce.  CNAP is challenged with distributing limited funds  using their primary tool the 
OP-20.  The OP-20 serves as a budgeting formulation document and an execution-
monitoring tool.  During budgeting , the OP-20 displays funding requirements by aircraft 
type, model, series (T/M/S) and the OP-20 also becomes  the Navy’s primary budget 
exhibit tool displaying the FHP funding requirements during submission and review, to 
OSD and OMB. 
1. Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) 
 PMR serves as a subjective means to distribute a limited number of flight hour 
funds among the various activities.  PMR is currently maintained at a Navy wide rate of 
83% plus 2% of the flying hours-per-formed in aircraft simulators.  (Jones, 2001, P. 427)  
To assist in the allocation of funds to the fleet, the OP-20 is separated into three 
schedules to reflect different mission areas:  
Sched Mission Definition 
A TACAIR/ASW Carrier Air Wings, Marine air wings, land and sea-based units 
committed to combat operations funded at 83% PMR.  This category 
constitutes the bulk of the Navy/Marine Corps aviation warfighting 
capability, which primarily consists of those squadrons capable of 
executing the “joint strike” and “crises response” missions in support 
of the National Military Strategy.  (1A1A fund code) 
B FLEET AIR 
TRAINING 
(FAT) 
This category (also referred to as Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS), 
consists of squadrons that train pilots and navigators prior to joining 
TACAIR/ASW and Fleet Air Support units.  These squadrons are 
dedicated to training fleet aircrews in each particular type aircraft and 
funded at 100% student throughput.  (1A2A fund code) 
C FLEET AIR 
SUPPORT 
(FAS)   
The primary mission of these squadrons is to provide direct and 
indirect support (including logistics) to Navy and Marine Corps fleet 
operating units and shore installations.  Their funding is based on 
Naval Center for Cost Analyses (NCCA) methodologies and historical 
execution.  Common mission examples include Carrier-on-Board 
Delivery, and Search and Recovery (1A1A fund code) 
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IV. FLIGHT HOUR OTHER PROGRAM 
 FO costs are not included in the OP-20.  These “other” costs represents outlays 
for flight simulator operations, Fleet Replenishment Squadron operations, civilian labor, 
administrative supplies, material,  equipment, maintenance service contracts, and expense 
for travel and lodging associated with pilot and crew Temporary Additional Duty (TAD).  
(Keating, 1998) While most of the costs are considered essential to Naval Aviation, there 
are no FHP resources programmed by N-88F.  FO is a level of effort program and costs 
are incorporated in the Major Claimants’ regular budget submission.  The Air TYCOMs 
provide input for the development of this budget, based on their forecasted requirements 
for the FO category of funds (Last years spending + a predetermined Inflation Rate).  FO 
category has consistently been under funded and been a constant drain on the FHP dollars 
as that funding gets reprogrammed to meet the FO shortfalls.  Commander Naval Air 
Forces Comptroller provided the following amplifying information regarding O&M,N 
AGSAG fund code Descriptions that impact the Flight hour Other program: 
A. 1A1A MISSION AND OTHER FLIGHT OPERATIONS 
Mission and Other Flight Operations includes all Navy and Marine Corps 
Tactical Air (TACAIR) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) forces, 
shore-based fleet air support, operational testing and evaluation, operation 
and maintenance of White House helicopters, and miscellaneous items 
such as transportation of squadron equipment, travel/TAD during 
deployment workup and training range support.  Funding provides flying 
hours to maintain an adequate level of readiness enabling Navy and 
Marine Corps aviation forces to perform their primary mission as required 
in support of national objectives.  Primary mission readiness (PMR) is 
expressed as a percentage and reflects the amount of hours that aircrews 
must fly to maintain adequate proficiency and perform the primary 
mission of a particular type-model-series (TMS) of aircraft including all 
weather day/night carrier operations and other assigned tasks.  The 
requested funds buy 83% PMR plus two- percent simulator contribution 
totaling 85 percent PMR in FY 2001. This TACAIR/ASW level is 
considered the minimum acceptable level.  To ensure readiness and pilot 
proficiency, deployed crews receive 110 percent PMR; crews in work-up 
receive 100 percent PMR, while non-deployed crews fly at reduced level. 
PMR executed in FY 1999 was 83%, and in FY 2000 and FY 2001 it is 
estimated to be 85%. 
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B. 1A2A FLEET AIR TRAINING 
Fleet Air Training includes Fleet Readiness Squadrons (FRS) which train 
replacement aircrews for each Navy and Marine Corps type/model/series 
in weapons tactics training, weapons delivery qualifications, carrier 
landing qualifications and provide services to fleet squadrons to develop 
and maintain air-to-air combat skills.  These FRS are located throughout 
the country. Student levels are established by authorized TACAIR/ASW 
force level requirements, aircrew personnel rotation rates, and the student 
output from Undergraduate Pilot/NFO Training Program.  Specialized 
schools include the Navy Test Pilot School and the Naval Strike and Air 
Warfare Center (NSAWC).  Fleet Air Training also includes operations 
and maintenance of training devices and simulators. Management of the 
acquisition of training devices and simulators is also included. 
 
C. 1C1C COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS 
 Funding provides for communications systems which directly 
support fleet operations including Fleet Ballistic Missile Strategic and 
Airborne Communications to ensure survivable communications with 
deployed strategic forces. Airborne communication provides a percentage 
of airborne communication coverage for Fleet Command and Control as 
an integral part of national defense strategy and in support of worldwide 
retaliatory forces. Operations financed in this program include aircraft 
operating costs for fuel, organizational and intermediate maintenance, 
squadron supplies, aviation depot level repairables, contract flight crew 
training, and training sites. Commander, Pacific Fleet has resources for all 
Strategic Communications (STRATCOMM) operations.  Current activity 
within this program provides synchronized low frequency spectrum 
communication coverage to deployed strategic forces.  To provide this 
support, a mix of airborne and strip-alert coverage with aircraft utilizing 
foreign and domestic airfields is employed. 
 STRATCOMM Wing One's primary mission is to provide 
connectivity between the National Command Authority (NCA) and the 
nation's nuclear forces as an element of the Strategic Connectivity System 
(SCS) and to maintain and operate facilities, provide services and material, 
and administrative control of support operations of strategic 
communications squadrons, and other operating forces and activities of the 
Navy as prescribed by higher authority. 
 The Mobile Ashore Support Terminal (MAST) is a self-contained 
portable C41 system which can be rapidly deployed to provide an initial 
C41 capability for a Naval Component Commander (NCC) for a Naval 
Liaison Detachment operating ashore. The Mobile Integrated Command 
Facility (MICFAC) is a complete mobile command center designed to 
support the NCC in Joint Operations. MAST and MICFAC have replaced 
the old mission TAD. Additionally, the AN/MSQ-126 Tactical Command 
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System, also known as the Crash Out Package (COP), is a program funded 
in this budget line. 
 Commander, U.S. Maritime Defense Zone Pacific 
(COMUSMARDEZPAC) is a Coast Guard activity that receives funding 
from CINCPACFLT for travel, transportation and other purchased 
services costs. COMUSMARDEZPAC is responsible to Fleet 
Commanders for planning and coordinating U.S. coastal and harbor 
defense. The Navy is responsible for peacetime financing of both supplies 
and equipment required to enable the U.S. Coast Guard to perform 
military functions upon incorporation into the Navy, or to prepare for such 
incorporation. 
 Additional programs supported are Electronic Command and 
Control Systems including Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Centers 
(ASWOCs), Operation Support System (OSS), Navy Tactical Command 
Systems Afloat (NTCSA), Global Command and Control System (GCCS), 
and Joint Maritime Command Information Systems (JMCIS) (ashore, 
tactical/mobile and afloat).  The Follow-On Satellite Program supports the 
Fleet satellite constellation and provides reliable communication links 
among Navy forces with EHF, UHF and SHF capabilities.  Finally, this 
budget line also includes funding for Arms Control implementation which 
provides inspection support, data collection and training for the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Chemical Weapons Convention, Open 
Skies and Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 
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V. PROCESS CHANGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Many books have been published regarding change.  There are a myriad of ways 
one could pursue in undertaking an introduction to the material.  The aim of this project 
report is to provide the basic framework, examples, and a roadmap on the journey that is 
process improvement, engineering, and reengineering.    
If you can't describe what you are doing as a process, you don't know what 
you're doing. 
(Deming, 1900-1993) 
 A process is a series of interrelated activities which bring about a result or which 
are directed toward a particular aim.  (LCPowers.com, 2004)  Process improvement is the 
analysis and improvement of a process or processes that lead to change on some level 
within an organization.  It is the level of change that determines if process improvement, 
engineering, or re-engineering is occurring.   
B. PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 
 Process improvement is change on some small incremental level that enhances 
one or two process within one Business Unit (BU) of an organization.  It is the 
streamlining of a process, elimination of inefficiency, or maximization of a resource 
within a BU.  As such, process improvement occurs on the operational level.  It requires 
no organizational strategic reassessment, no cultural shift, little to no buy-in from 
coworkers or leadership, it can be as simple as an individual understanding the process 
he/she is involved with, identifying a need for change, creating metrics to measure the 
effectiveness of the change, and then implementing the change.  As leaders in the armed 
forces, it is this type of change we are most familiar with.  Incremental process 
improvement serves to improve organizational performance and enhance quality of life.  
Leaders who allow this change to occur will reap the benefits of improved moral and a 
workforce that is constantly searches for ways to exceed organizational expectations in 
meeting there operational challenges. 
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C. PROCESS ENGINEERING 
 Engineering means to establish efficient work processes when work is first 
undertaken.  One has to answer the question; is this process in need of reinvention or 
reengineering.  Reinvention is applied within organizations seeking to merely increase 
efficiency (Jones, 1999, P. 81), in contrast reengineering concentrates on “starting over” 
rather than on trying to “fix” existing process problems with marginal or incremental 
“band-aid” solutions.  (Jones, 1999, P. 47)  The military is famous for its band-aid fixed, 
better known as FITREP bullets -- which is not necessarily a bad thing.  It is just easier at 
the Echelon four and below level commands to process engineer because it is when you 
get above this level of command the bureaucratic side of the armed forces rears its head.  
And you cannot reengineer within the DoN without involving at least an Echelon Three 
organization.  
D. PROCESS REENGINEERING  
 Reengineering is a top-down process where in the organization, typically driven 
by resource constraints and competitive market pressures, attempts to serve its customers 
better by reducing work process cycle time.  Reengineering is intended to make quantum 
rather than marginal performance improvements. (Jones, 1999, P. 47)  Therefore, it is 
critical that information technology play a role in process improvement wherever 
possible.  It is one of the simplest medians to help people work smarter.  For Process 
Reengineering (PR) to be successful, it must involve a commitment from the top down.  
There is precedent within the Navy.  The Navy with the help of The Thomas Group (a 
Cycle Time management company) totally reengineered its Naval Aviation production 
process.  The Naval Aviation Production Process Improvement (NAPPI) program took 
several years to institute, but resulted in a 30% reduction across the board in the Navy’s 
Street-to-Fleet production process.   
E. NAVAL AVIATOR PRODUCTION PROCESS IMPROVEMENT (NAPPI) 
CASE STUDY.  A VIEW AS A USER 
1. Introduction 
 In the late nineties, it was apparent the Navy had under assessed the number of 
pilots it would need to meet fleet demand.  FRS (Fleet Replacement Squadron) Class 
sizes were down, and fleet demand had remained constant.  Under accession of 
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Replacement Pilots (RPs) in the 1993 to 1996 year groups led to first tour lengths 
increasing to 43 months (target first tour length was 36 months).  Additionally, TACAIR 
(Tactical Air) pilots were averaging about 4 years to get to the fleet and helicopter pilot 
averages had increased to over 2.5 years.  Naval aviation was at a critical juncture as it 
strived to stabilize its air force and rebuild the depth in its junior officer ranks.  (N88, 
2000) 
 The bottom line was, and still is, that Pilot/NFO production is expensive; with 
first sea tours extending beyond the traditional 36-months, retention and moral were 
beginning to suffer.  The Navy needed to find ways to maximize efficiency, (given its 
constrained resources) and get control of the production process.  Lastly the Navy needed 
to arrest its increased first tour lengths to help improve retention and morale (Emmel, 
1999). 
2. Leading Organizational Change 
 The Navy developed the Naval Aviator Production Process Improvement 
(NAPPI) program.  To manage the NAPPI effort, the naval aviator production team 
(NAPT) was established at the headquarters level, and three cross-functional teams 
(CFT's) were established at the operator level (owners of the NAPP).  The charter of 
these teams is to reduce TTT while maintaining the high quality of our aviation 
professionals.  At that time, NAPT membership included N88, CNAL, CNET, USMC 
DCS(air), CNP, CNAP, and CNATRA.  The NAPP environment also included 26 
training squadrons at 17 bases.  It involved 29 types of aircraft, 3800 students (including 
NFOs) with 1000 graduating each year (N88, 2000). 
 An additional member of the NAPPI process and NAPT team was the Thomas 
Group (TG).  A Dallas-based international production consulting company that provides 
solutions to significantly improve business processes for corporate and government 
clients.  TG was contracted by the Navy (at over $6M a year) to help reduce the time to 
train naval aviators.  The NAPPI program was implemented working with the TG using a 
proven methodology called “Total Cycle Time” (TCT), to drive the process 
improvement.  Key was to identify barriers to the production process and find ways to 
eliminate or mitigate those barriers.  
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3. Gaining Control of the Process (Harnessing Time to Train) 
 Following commissioning, all pilots start the training pipeline at Aviation 
Preflight Indoctrination (API), a six week program taught at Naval Aviation Schools 
Command onboard NAS Pensacola, FL.  From API, they attend 22 weeks of Primary 
pilot training.  After that, the amount of time needed to complete the training pipeline 
varies based on the platform the student will fly.  Unknown variables such as inclement 
weather, aircraft availability or personal issues such as illness, and order writing between 
schools, can also affect the time required.  Discounting all of those uncontrollable 
elements, the process takes from 27 (HSL helo) to 48 months for strike pilots.  (N88, 
2000) 
 Developing a more efficient process, which results in timelier production of naval 
aviators and minimizes the negative impact on manpower management and retention, is 
one of the keys to improving future fleet readiness.  The only effective and long-term 
solution to accomplish the goal of significantly reducing time to train (TTT) is to focus 
on improving the process itself by removing barriers to progress (N88, 2000).   These 
barriers include policy, structure and resourcing.  Leaders at the Air Force level were also 
realizing it was time to stop asking training commands to do more with less.  Enter the 
TG consultants (or as they introduced themselves to me, resultants).  These guys were 
salesman on steroids.  No nonsense, down-in-the-trenches, results-oriented professionals 
whose goal was to work side by side us (the operators) at the commissioning sources, in 
the classrooms, and at the squadrons.  They were not there to make friends; they were 
there to improve the process. 
4. Corporate (Command) Culture and Performance 
 While at HSL-41 I was there from the beginning, providing initial interviews with 
the resultants, and beta testing the early metrics through the first year and a half of 
implementation.  I worked side by side with the TG resultants to determine what metrics 
were important in capturing FRS efficiency and effectiveness.  The environment was 
hostile at first.  There were a lot of non-believers, no one really saw a problem, doing 
more with less was so ingrained in our culture no one thought anything of it.  TG initial 
challenge was to examine the Navy Aviator Production Process (NAPP), identify 
inefficiencies in the process, and determine methods of improvement.  TG’s resultants 
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worked on-site with us, providing training to analyze operations, and helped implement 
their speed-based improvement strategies.   
 The goal is to apply the team's focus on identifying and eliminating barriers to 
production improvement while standardizing production efforts throughout the naval 
aviation training process (VT’s through FRS).  With an overall goal to involve all 
training process owners from accessions through the FRS (street to the fleet) in rapidly 
implementing a new standardized approach to production systems.  “This approach is 
similar in scope to the benefits achieved with the implementation of NATOPS” (N88, 
2000).   
 Overcoming cultural bias is never easy; it was a challenge to get the department 
Heads to discuss the issue seriously.  At the time we had never graduated a class late (so 
of course we did not have a problem).  The problem was, we had never truly met fleet 
demand either.  Due to under accession, the training command was not delivering the 
number of students our load demand called for.  Therefore it was easy to get them in and 
out on schedule because our resources were not being tested.  
In other words our west coast LAMPS (Light Airborne Multipurpose 
System) squadron requirement called for approximately 65 first tour 
aviators annually.  Production at that time was approximately 45-50.  The 
fleet squadrons rarely complained because we had always been 
accustomed to doing more with less, and first tour pilot extensions had 
become routine (approx 43-45 months) and were always approved.  
(Emmel, 1999) 
 We needed to get a hold of our production efforts, implement process 
improvements, and monitor results.  To a stick-and-rudder guy, tracking TTT (Time to 
Train) requirements is a convoluted process and about as desirable as watching paint dry.  
But with the metrics incorporated in the CockPit (C/P) charts (designed to track the 
people, parts, and planes required in Pilot/NFO production), we began to get our hands 
on what it takes to raise production levels up to those necessary to meet fleet demand.   
 As the Training Department became better at interpreting the C/P charts data, 
other departments started to take note.  Maintenance recognized that the number of 
personnel, parts, and aircraft required to meet production might not be sustainable 
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without real change.  Training was realizing its own inefficiencies.  The training syllabus 
would have to be streamlined to improve efficiency, maximize utilization of limited 
resources, and minimize TTT.  It became abundantly clear; we could no longer accept 
extended TTT as the cost of doing business.  We streamlined lectures, created more 
flexibility (like scheduling trainers and classroom requirements on weekends).  And 
through the C/P charts we could measure whether or not or methods were successful. 
5. Measuring Effectiveness 
 In the early nineties, squadrons found ways to uniquely spin their 
accomplishments.  Most of their methods for doing so were subjective and they were not 
standardized across community lines.  The Cockpit charts provided a means for 
squadrons to measure their effectiveness in a standardized manner across the board.  On a 
monthly basis, Squadrons rolled their C/P chart data up the chain of command (COC).  
The data covered Manpower issues, Aircraft & parts, and Key performance (production).   
 Once each department understood the deliverables, it was not difficult to combine 
the data into the final product.  Production metrics gave each training squadron a standard 
means of measuring effectiveness.  These were briefed to the FRS CO, Wing 
Commodore, and ultimately all the way up to the Air Board monthly. 
6. Effectiveness vs. Efficiency  
 While analyzing the key measurements chart (production), the manning and 
Aircraft charts provided the means to identify inefficiencies, shortfalls, or barriers to 
production (Emmel, 1999).  Issues the FRS could not resolve were elevated up the chain 
to give their COC a chance to help resolve the issue.  I personally cannot say enough 
about this new system of doing business.  The Navy finally has a method of objectifying 
performance.  Publicly this has begun to win acceptance, but off the record its commands 
see this as a double edged sword (i.e., COC can use the data to call commands on the 
carpet based on C/P chart analysis).  Bottom line:  This tool is helping keep the press on 
production and eliminate inefficiencies by enabling commands and those in their COC to 
identify and even predict where problems are or are developing in the production process.  
We can now focus on training and fixing the problem instead of spending all our time 
trying to figure out what the problem is. 
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7. Seeing is Believing; Believing is Seeing 
 Naval Aviation has always prided itself in its ability to adapt, improvise, and 
overcome.  That being said, its methods are pretty conventional.  The Thomas Group 
brought an out-of-the-box (in military circles anyway) approach to production 
management into an old school system.  And it was no big surprise that it was not 
initially well received.  Four years after its inception, I noted the C/P charts were still met 
with raised eyebrows, but there is no denying the effectiveness of this tool.  It enabled the 
training command(s) to get a handle on the process of producing aviators.  Production 
results have been objectified.  Squadrons can now isolate barriers to production, take pro-
active steps to correct, and then monitor for desired results.  Only time will tell if 
stakeholders will totally buy-in to this approach.  It is clear the stakeholders above the 
FRS level have, and while once a skeptic, the Thomas Group approach made a believer 
out of me.  I can also add (with absolute certainty), without the flag level support this 
reengineering effort received; the NAPPI would have failed.   
F. CNAP COMPTROLLER PROCESS ENGINEERING EXERCISE. A 
CONSULTANT VIEW  
1. Introduction 
 The project completed by team three was quite different than what anyone 
thought it would be.  After a three week delay at the start of the course, a project 
involving reengineering the Flight Hour Program (FHP) for the Commander Naval Air 
Pacific (CNAP) was selected by the team.  The FHP program is a well documented and 
often studied process that due to its large scope is a constant target for reengineering to 
help further reduce costs and optimize the expense of every dollar. 
 The budget process is in need of process reengineering.  A number of the goals of 
reengineering are applicable in the budget process.  Specifically: the need to increase 
customer satisfaction (up and down the Chain of command), attain greater efficiency, and 
optimize costs.  Additionally, with greater emphasis being placed on the accuracy of our 
budget proposals, the need to not exceed cost estimates, and the need to achieve the 
greatest level of readiness possible given the financial constraints necessitates the need to 
get a hold of this process.   
 32
 After an initial meeting with Dr. Lawrence Jones (MBA project sponsor), Glenn 
Cook (IS4220 course instructor), Capt Moore (CNAP Comptroller), and Clinton Miles 
(CNAP Deputy Comptroller), it was determined that a process reengineering effort 
involving the FHP program would be too broad in scope.  We learned CNAP was 
working another issue involving Flight- hour Other (FO) management with OPNAV and 
it was agreed upon that reengineering the FO program was a more manageable task given 
the constraints of the IS4220 course of study. 
2. Project Preliminary Findings 
 Myself, LT Mike Wagner, and LT Ashton Feehan traveled to CNAP (located on 
NAS North Island in San Diego CA) on an information gathering/ fact finding mission.  
We quickly realized there was more to this issue than discussed during the initial phone 
conference.  We essentially learned there was no FO program.  FO costs are not included 
in the OP-20.  These “other” costs represent outlays for flight simulator operations, Fleet 
Replenishment Squadron operations, civilian labor, administrative supplies, material,  
equipment, maintenance service contracts, and expense for travel and lodging associated 
with pilot and crew Temporary Additional Duty (TAD).  While most of the costs are 
considered essential to Naval Aviation, there are no FHP resources programmed by N-
88F for FO.  FO is a “level-of-effort” program where costs are incorporated in the Major 
Claimants’ regular budget submission.  The Air Type Commanders (TYCOMs) provide 
input for the development of this budget, based on their forecast requirements for the FO 
category of funds (Last years spending plus a predetermined Inflation Rate).  The FO 
category has consistently been under funded and has been a constant drain on the FHP 
dollars as that funding gets reprogrammed to meet the FO shortfalls throughout the 
budget cycle.  There are numerous additional programs included in FO, but we will forgo 
the discussion as non value added to this project report.   
 Further investigation revealed that unlike the FHP program, there was no “As-Is” 
process in place.  Current management of FO is an ad-hoc effort lacking standardization 
and verification.  The team could easily have spent the term just developing an accurate 
process map of how the comptroller department is managing FO.  Due to the course 
constraints and the busy time of year in the budget cycle even that was not an option.  We 
agreed upon a rough process map (Appendix A) and after much deliberation greatly 
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narrowed the scope of the project to creating a web-enabled database prototype that can 
generate Fund Summary Reports (FSR) and manage the CNAP OPTAR Authorization(s) 
Process.  Subsequently, we dropped the OPTAR Authorization(s) Process portion due to 
data unavailability.  The “As-Is” process map for generating the FSR is shown in 
Appendix B.   
3. Existing Process 
 The FSR is currently produced in manner that brings into question its timeliness 
and accuracy.  Essentially what occurs is similar funding data is tracked in various 
manners with no standardization.  Unit Transmittal Listings (TLs) are received 4 times a 
month and input into the Standard Accounting and Reporting System, Field Level 
(STARS-FL).  This lets CNAP know what has been spent.  CNAP Accounting 
Department uses Financial Resource Management System (FRMS) to reconcile their 
accounts.  FRMS and STARS-FL data is integrated into an Excel spreadsheet that is 
vulnerable to formulas and formats being written over.  Ultimately personnel spend so 
much time checking and validating the data that they roll into the follow-on week’s data 
timeline having never submitted or completed a report.  This observation was provided 
and validated by the Deputy Comptroller.   
 In Appendix B, the red dashed box indicates the actions performed in the FRMS 
database (FR 03, FR 04, FR 05).  The blue dashed box indicates the actions performed in 
the STARS-FL database (FR 01 and FR 02).  The remaining actions are generated by 
hand and with various Excel files.  These hand-generated tasks (FR 6, FR 7, and FR 8) 
are where the most difficulties occur and where our solution can offer the most benefit.   
4. “As-Is” KVA Discussion 
 The core processes listed in the “As-Is” process map (Appendix B) are further 
detailed in our KVA spreadsheet (Figure 6) and are analyzed to measure their 
productivity.  We included the number of people involved in each sub-process, the time it 
takes to complete the process, the number of times the process “fires” on a weekly basis, 
and the time it takes to learn the knowledge required to perform the process.  These four 
pieces of data were used to determine how much productivity each sub-process adds to 
the overall process.   
 This productivity measurement is a ratio called Return On Knowledge (ROK).  
We derive ROK in our spreadsheet by dividing our benefits by cost.  In our spreadsheet, 
this is total revenue divided by expenses.  Revenue is the “Actual Learning Time (hours)” 
multiplied by number of people it takes to complete the sub-process (#People Involved) 
and the number of times the process is repeated (Times Fired).  This is divided by 
“Expense”, which is calculated by multiplying “Time-To-Complete per firing” by the 
number of people involved.  
 The five gray colored processes in our “As-Is” KVA Spreadsheet indicate where 
the FSR is generated.  These are the areas where we believe that Information Technology 
(IT) could most improve the overall process.  Currently these steps are performed by an 
Excel spreadsheet that requires queries, pivot tables, refreshing, and in some cases 
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8 1 8 8 64.00 64 10%
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Query Stars to 
generate 
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and STARS






2 1 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 10%
238%
Budget Analyst Update DATE field on FSR manually 2 1 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 10%
Budget Analyst Reconcile FSR 2 1 1 8 16.00 2 80%
Budget Analyst/ 
Asst. Comptroller Review FSR 5 1 1 8 40.00 5 80%
 
Figure 7 “As-Is”  Knowledge Value Added Data (From: Team 3, 2003) 
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spreadsheet, shows these five steps yielding a 237.6% Return on Knowledge.  While this 
is not a modest figure, we recognize that there is still potential for improvement.  
Implementing a web-enabled database eliminates the possibility of data transfer errors or 
manual input errors.  The functions that currently require human input will be seamless 
and transparent to the user.   
5. “To-Be” KVA Discussion 
 As demonstrated on the “To-Be” KVA spreadsheet (figure 7), replacing the Excel 
version of the FSR with our more robust web-enabled database has reduced the 
previously required five steps to one step (listed in gray).  The time to complete these 
steps has been reduced from 2.2 hours to a mere .25 hours (15 minutes).  The reduction in 
number of processes and time to complete them causes our ROK to double from 237.6% 
to 481.2%.  The significance is not so much in the numbers themselves as it is in their 
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8 1 8 8 64 64 10%
Budget Analyst Generate Funds Status Report 2 1 0.25 100% 12.03 24.06 0.5 481%
Budget Analyst/ 
Asst. Comptroller Review FSR 5 1 1 8 40 5 80%
Legend:  5 steps from the As is spread sheet reduced to one step.  
We have increased our Return on Knowledge from 237.6% to 481.2% by reducing time of completion 
from 2.2 hours to .25 hours  
Figure 8 To-Be Knowledge Value Added Data (From: Team 3, 2003) 
 
6. Our Solution “To-Be”/ Prototype Discussion 
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 To narrow the scope and to enable the team to complete the project within the 
time constraints of the course, we created our improved version of an FSR, ours being an 
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automated web-enabled database driven report vice a manual Excel spreadsheet.  This 
can provide Management a tool that would enable the leadership (Comptroller, Deputy 
Comptroller) the capability to view the current status of the FO budget at any given point 
in time.  This is a significant improvement over the process that is currently being used.  
Implementing our prototype, however, would simply be a Band-Aid.  The much larger 
issue is that CNAP Comptroller’s Office is a prime candidate for a more “radical” 
Business Process Reengineering (BPR) project because there is no standardization, no 
verification, and no validation processes in place within the organization to help them 
successfully manage over 3 billion dollars a year in CNAP FHP/FO funding.  Our 
incremental solution is depicted in Appendix C.  The areas targeted were: 
¾ Providing a method to input and edit data from the budgeting process, FRMS and 
STARS-FL. 
¾ Display the overall budget status in an easily readable format. 
 We determined that by utilizing web-enabled forms, we could reduce the 
possibility of inaccurate reports.  The current process is manual data entry in an Excel 
spreadsheet.  Analysts often end up corrupting the data by accidentally deleting formulas.  
Our web-based solution takes the access to formulas out of the control of users. 
A dummy database was created to represent the data from FRMS and STARS-FL.  
Both the database and web portal were named, “COMNAVAIRPAC.”  The better way to 
perform this process would have been to build Structured Query Language (SQL) 
statements to automatically draw this data from the existing databases (FRMS & STARS-
FL) to avoid redundancy in data input.  We were unable, however, to gain access to these 
databases.  The FRMS is proprietary and developed by CACI International Incorporated 
who also developed and maintains the Aviation Cost Evaluation System (ACES).  ACES 
is used to manage the Navy’s Flight Hour Program.  The legalities of creating an 
interface would have to be researched before any further development could be 
undertaken.  The Database Schema and several screenshots of the web Comptroller’s 
Portal are included for review in Appendix D. 
 Our solution turned out to be a very basic representation of the current FO budget 
status.  It would be useful to create drill down and query capabilities for the reports.  The 
“Status” page however, turned out to be far more complicated to create than we had 
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originally anticipated.  Visual Basic Script had to be used to sum up all of the records 
since Dreamweaver does not contain this capability.  This coding turned out to be fairly 
complex and prohibitive to creating a query capability within our time and knowledge 
level constraints.  In addition, making the database more complicated to provide drill-
down capability would create the requirement to enter data multiple times.  As a “proof 
of concept”, the code and database of our prototype work fine and the client saw the 
benefits of moving to a similar type of web-enabled comprehensive report. 
7. Project Final Considerations 
 We recognize our solution to build a new database was not the most effective 
method to handle the problem, but given the constraints we faced it was a viable solution.  
There are other methods to gain access to the necessary information within FRMS and 
STARS-FL databases.  A tool like Crystal Reports (already used within the CNAP 
Comptroller Office) is a technology that can drill down into FRMS and STARS-FL.  The 
FRMS contractors we spoke with have the necessary skills to exercise this option, but 
they have not been contracted to do this. 
 It is generally viewed that the entire DoD budget and execution process needs to 
be radically overhauled (case and point are the Rumsfeld efforts currently underway).  As 
a result, it was difficult to apply the KVA to broken and non-existent processes.  In order 
to make the web database prototype fully functional, the first step should be to revise the 
database interface between FRMS and STARS-FL, so that there is a single and 
consolidated input to the website or presentation and tracking tool.  This would allow the 
data to be manipulated and displayed in a variety of ways.  Contractor support is already 
in place to perform this function and just requires the funding.  This project only focused 
on the Flight Other (FO) account, but the follow-on web database could easily 
accommodate any or all of the other accounts under CNAP control.  In order to realize 
significant KVA increases, process control must be implemented throughout the 
organization.  Once this occurs, then the organization can be truly analyzed for 
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness.  Our team’s initial analysis of the CNAP organization 
has provided the foundation for subsequent analysis and research. 
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G. KEY CONTRIBUTORS IN PROCESS IMPROVEMENT/ ENGINEERING/ 
REENGINEERING EFFORTS   
 For the purposes of discussion, Process Improvement, Engineering, and Re-
engineering are interchangeable in this section.  Because regardless of the scale of 
change, all of these factors play a role, it is merely a question of the magnitude of the 
role.  There are several noted key contributing factors that are necessary for any process 
improvement to be successful: 
¾ Commitment to reform at the top of the organization. 
¾ A meaningful, clear vision, a set of goals, and a plan of action. 
¾ Organization-wide understanding of the vision, goals, and plan of 
action. 
¾ A sense of urgency. 
¾ An understanding of obstacles to change and persistence in 
overcoming them. 
¾ Performance measures and a willingness to learn from one’s mistakes. 
¾ Recognition of successes and extraordinary efforts. 
¾ Institutionalization of continuous improvement. 
   (Jones, 2001) 
1. Committed Leadership 
 This is the most critical aspect of any process improvement effort.  The surest 
guarantee that a process improvement effort will fail is if management is fails to strongly 
endorse the effort or more dangerous, is overtly indifferent.  While it was not clearly 
communicated out of the gate in the NAPPI case, by the end of the 2nd quarter there was 
no doubt the highest levels of leadership of OPNAV was clearly committed, and the 
results showed.  With the CNAP Comptroller case, the interest was clearly there, but 
competing priorities kept any process improvement on hold. 
2. Clear Vision and a Plan of Action 
 Often, the best of intentions fail in the absence of clear direction.  An articulate, 
inspiring vision statement from the highest levels of leadership where the desired end-
state is clearly articulated is essential to successful implementation of BPR.  Likewise, 
managements Plan of action should be in alignment with leaderships Vision statement 
and provide a roadmap outlying the direction, milestones, and timelines the organization 
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must meet to effectively achieve senior leadership’s vision and successfully navigate the 
murky waters of BPR.  BPR is hard, and can cost and organization large amounts of 
intellectual capital to see it through prior to any real process improvement gains being 
realized.  The absence of a Vision Statement and a Plan of Action can lead to an 
organization chasing the preverbal Red Herring, loosing their direction, and ultimately 
seeing what might have been a successful BPR effort failing.  OPNAV and a chorus of 
flag level leadership articulated the vision and they along with senior level resultants 
communicated and monitored the plan of action.  A suggested plan of action is offered 
later in the project report for CNAP’s Comptroller.  
3. Organizational-Wide Understanding 
 The best way to ensure a clear understanding of an organizations vision and plan 
of action is to articulate and drive them from the top.  Senior leadership should look for 
opportunities to show their commitment to BPR whenever possible.  Senior leadership 
often tends to lend support to BPR at the beginning of the effort, but routinely delegates 
all aspects of the effort to the line/functional manager level to carry it out.  When what 
they should do is stay engaged in the effort.  Let the line/functional managers run with 
the day to day management of the BPR effort, but senior management must be visible and 
vocal in their efforts to stay informed.  Then they must articulate this level of interest in 
the same manner they would articulate interest in any revenue enhancing measure the 
organization is undertaking.  Leaders who ensure, people in their organization are in 
alignment with, and understand the importance and significance of a particular goal are 
far more likely to reap the successes of their organization achieving the goal.  BPR is no 
different and should be treated accordingly by senior level leadership. 
4. A Sense of Urgency 
 On the NAPPI side, it took months for the operational layer to realize this effort 
had flag level attention and was going to happen.  Once this flag level sense of urgency 
was communicated; as with any military unit; the change was great and immediate.  
Within the CNAP Comptroller, the sense of urgency existed at the executive level but 
was not being conveyed in an effective manner down the chain of command.  The 
absence of a sense of urgency creates an environment where nothing gets done.  
Management must communicate this sense and provide the education necessary to 
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reinforce the reality and need for the sense of urgency.  The momentum created through a 
sense of urgency can go a long way in overcoming obstacles to change. As observed in 
the NAPPI case study.   
5. Understanding Obstacles to Change and Persistence in Overcoming 
Them 
 There are many motivators to Obstacles to change.  They can be survival related, 
political, rice-bowl, or even just plain old laziness.  What ever the reason, management 
has to recognize that in some form obstacles to change will exist, and they need to pro-
actively move to overcome them.  Providing performance measurements and rewards 
systems are two positive methods to overcoming obstacles to change.  For whatever 
reasons, the Thomas Group resultants seamed ill prepared to deal with the obstacles to 
change.  However, the performance measures provided and monitored in the NAPPI 
effort proved very effective in overcoming obstacles to change.  While not implemented 
due time, the FSR could certainly attain the same results for CNAP’s Comptroller. 
6. Performance Measurement and Willingness to Experiment 
 This is a difficult and essential requirement to process reengineering.  Metrics 
must be objective, tangible, and measurable.  With considerable effort, the NAPPI team 
produced and implemented a set of metrics that were acceptable across the different 
aviation communities (TACAIR, Fixed Wing, and Helicopter).  This also provided a 
standardized means to measure effectiveness across community lines that had not 
previously existed for OPNAV.  This factor could be encompassed in any IT related 
solution agreed upon by the Comptroller and his staff. 
7. Recognition of Successes and Extraordinary Efforts 
 This is where leadership can have its greatest impact on reengineering efforts.  
Generating an understanding is not enough.  Recognizing those who are moving the 
organization (in a positive way) in the direction of change is essential to getting buy-in 
and to reinforcing (and rewarding) employees who embody the sense of urgency 
communicated by management. 
8. Continuous Improvement 
 The real truth about BPR is that it is a journey not a destination.  For long term 
success it must become a part of the organizations culture.  Anything less and the effort 
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becomes just the latest fad to be thrown into the proverbial wastebasket.  Equally 
important to getting on and staying on the path of continuous improvement is education 
and training.  It is critical staffs are trained in the correct implementation of the new 
process and that a training plan is in place to ensure standardization is maintained 
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VI. ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PLANNING SYSTEM (ERP) 
 
 
Figure 9 ERP Evolutionary Timeline (From: Jakovijevic, 2000, P. 8) 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
 The foundation of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) dates back to the 60’s in 
the manufacturing sector and its evolution encompasses Materials Requirement Planning 
(MRP), Closed Loop MRP, MRPII, ERP, and IERP over the course of a 40 year period 
and continues to evolve as ERP systems migrate to the internet as ERPII systems are 
brought on line. 
1. Materials Requirement Planning (MRP)/ Closed Loop MRP  
 The focus of these systems was in the area of inventory control.  It was developed 
in the age of the Reorder Point System (ROP) where the assumption was that the 
customers order/reorder habits would be consistent.  MRP demonstrated its effectiveness 
in reducing inventories and reductions in production and delivery lead times.  MRP 
enabled manufacturers to plan for “having the right materials at the right time” 
(Jakovijevic, 2000) in the manufacturing process.  However there was no accounting or 
financial planning segments as of yet.  As computing capacity evolved and became more 
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financially affordable the market was able to address the short comings of MRP with the 
development of Closed loop MRP.  Closed Loop MRP incorporated the necessary 
accounting and financial planning segments MRP lacked.  Additionally, Closed Loop 
MRP took into account production capacity constraints (previously presumed to be 
infinity), and Closed Look MRP came to be called Capacity Requirements Planning 
(CRP). (Jakovijevic, 2000) 
2. Materials Requirement Planning II (MRPII) 
Prior to MRPII the basic component packages of MRP and CRP where not fully 
integrated.  Technology had not allowed it but, once again technology evolved at a pace 
that enabled MRP/CRP to continue its evolution. 
 MRPII closed the loop with the financial accounting and financial management 
systems.  The American Production and Inventory Control Society (APICS) defined 
MRPII as follows: 
MRPII is ‘a method for the effective planning of all resources of a 
manufacturing company.  Ideally, it addresses operational planning in 
units, financial planning in dollars, and has a simulation capability to 
answer “what if” questions.  It is made up of a variety of functions, each 
linked together: business planning, sales and operations planning, 
production planning, and the execution support systems for capacity and 
material.’  
(Jakovijevic, 2000) 
For the first time, organizations could have an integrated business system providing;  
a.  Visibility to material requirements and capacity limitations driven from a 
desired operations plan. 
b.  Enabled input of detailed activities. 
c.  Translated all this activity to a financial statement, and suggested actions to 
address those items that were not in balance with the desired plan.  
 It the belief that ‘good information leads to good decisions’ then the integrated 
nature of MRPII system certainly provides a competitive advantage for functional areas 
of organizations which are able to incorporate the system.  However, not all functional 
areas of the organization could use the MRPII system.  As other functional areas 
requested help, systems were developed within the organization to help support 
additional functional areas.  For example, Accounting and Finance had a set of programs 
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that helped it manage the general ledger, accounts payable & receivable, as well as 
capital assets and financial reporting.  Where MRPII integrated manufacturing programs, 
these accounting programs were combined to form an integrated system for accounting.  
Sales, Engineering, Purchasing, Logistics, Project Control, Customer Service, and 
Human Resources followed suit and each developed their own individual (see the 
problem) sets of integrated computer systems.  Unfortunately, these disparate systems 
were unable to interact and exchange information.  Any exchange information between 
these systems was time consuming and error prone. (Jakovijevic, 2000) 
3. ERP/Internet-Based ERP 
 By the 1980’s and early 1990’s it had become intuitively obvious that segmented 
integration within an organization is problematic.  While organizational business units 
thrived, the organization as a whole often experienced problems such as; cost overruns, 
process redundancy, organizational miscues, conflicting and untimely information flow 
to organizational executives to name a few.  During this period “time to market” had 
become a driving force in measuring organizational success.  This trend highlighted the 
need for business units to adopt an enterprise wide view within their area in order to 
attain and maintain a ‘time to market’ competitive advantage.  Technology and software 
development tool advancements coupled with reduced hardware costs paved the way to 


















Figure 10 Typical Commercial ERP Integration Diagram (From: Dougherty, 2001, 
P. 5) 
 
 ERP is a software application capable of instantly accessing and updating 
information shared among business units.  The software suite is generally comprised of 
industry accepted best practices for managing an organization.  These software 
applications help organizations manage the important parts of their business (Figure 9), 
including production, manufacturing, and maintenance planning; operations, inventory, 
facilities, and order management; interacting with suppliers, providing customer service; 
and more recently finance, and human resources application modules.  
 Typically, an ERP system uses or is integrated with a relational database system 
run on a client/server architecture.  This allows everyone to view and use the same data, 
i.e., the actions of one department’s program will drive the actions elsewhere. 
(Jakovijevic, 2000)  ERP can help companies become leaner by reducing costs, 
improving efficiency, standardizing and accelerating the flow of information.  The next 
logical step is to expand the enterprise view through the use of the internet which is what 
is taking place on a major scale today.  
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B. KEYS TO SUCCESS 
 There are five success factors necessary to help influence the chances of 
successfully integrating ERP into ones business Model. 
1. Recognize Out of the Gate, it is About the People not the Software 
 Most ERP implementation failures can be attributed to businesses not taking into 
account the people side of the equation.  With large-scale investments of this type it is 
imperative your ERP choice is in alignment with your business model, and your people 
do their job.  You also need to plan on the amount of training that will be involved and 
how employee turnover will figure into the implementation.   
2. Analyze and Formalize Your Own Business Best Practices from the 
Enterprise Level, Down to the Customer Service Representative 
 If your business model is flawed, this increases the chance of the ERP system 
failing.  The reasons are two fold.  First, ERP is in essence a “best practice” business tool.  
If your model is flawed, then your people will invariably fight the new technology.  
Additionally, because of the divergent systems, if will invariably take more time to 
implement the system, and that can significantly increase the cost of implementation as 
well as your revenue.  Working groups need to be formed in the different divisions, 
departments, etc…to capture what your businesses “best practices” are.  This should 
include a model/ vision for the future of what your people feel your best practices should 
be.  The middle management needs to work hand in hand with the working groups.  It is 
middle managements job to sell their product to the board…in the end, the process is 
completed when the organization (CEO, Management, Core employees) have achieved 
“buy-in” to their vision of “best-practices”.  Armed with this new knowledge, a business 
can then decide if an ERP product is right for them and if the answer is “yes”, which one.  
3. Leadership Endorsement (or Enforcement) of “Best Practices” 
 Not everyone will ultimately buy in to this new model.  It is the job of 
management and the CEO to set the tone, to lead the change in the underlying culture and 
support those in middle management leading the effort.  Only a united organization is 




4. CRM Must Be a Consideration 
 ERP is largely a behind the scenes tool designed to optimize how departments 
work together (through a common database).  Current models (this is changing) do not 
address the customer side of the house, nor does it address the e-commerce side of the 
house.  CRM is the answer to that side of the question but is does not readily integrate 
into current CRM systems.  This critical key should be addressed as early into the process 
as feasible, and should impact which vender you choose.  
5. Publish a Roadmap with Measurable Goals 
 “How do you know where you’re going, if you do not know where you have 
been?”  ERP implementation is not easy, by all accounts it is down right painful and as 
apposed to sale rep estimates on implementation time (3-6 months) it is more on the order 
of 1-3 years.  A business needs to have a detailed road map to fall back on when things 
get tough.  It needs to include negotiated measurable and review-able criteria.  This will 
help keep everyone focus in the right place during the dark days (and their will be many) 
of the implementation process. 
VII. ERP WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
 
 
A. ORIGIN OF NAVY ERP 
 ERP within the Department of the Navy (DoN) can trace its roots back to 1997 
when the Secretary of the Navy mandated that the Navy begin drafting a DoN strategic 
business plan as a means of addressing reform in the business affairs of the Department.  
This led to the establishment of the Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA).  In September 
of 1998, the RBA established working teams designed to identify short and long range 
goals and plans for reaching the identified goals.  The Commercial Financial Practices 
Working Group, led by VADM John Lockard (then COMNAVAIR), was one of the first 
working groups to be chartered.  (ERP Website, 2004)  The working group members 
were quick to realize the need to expand beyond financial business practices alone, rather 
adopt an enterprise view and look at a wider range of business practices.  This led to a 
subsequent name change of Commercial Business Practices (CBP) Working Group.  The 
group focus was in the areas of; examination of the state of commercial sector business 
practices, understanding the direction of changes in business practices, and developing a 
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way ahead for the DoN.  ERP was a component in the CBPs solution for the DoN.  
Specifically, the group believed this alternative would 
¾ Provide quality information for decision making to all levels of management 
¾ Improve efficiency and effectiveness (better, faster, cheaper) through re-
engineered business processes and integrated information provided to managers 
¾ Manage costs for maximum reallocation of resources to recapitalization and 
modernization efforts 
¾ Enable compliance with statutory requirements: Government Management 
Reform Act (GMRA), Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), Chief 
Financial Officer’s (CFO) Act, etc. 
(DoN ERP Website, 2004) 
 The CBP recommended the DoN conduct six ERP pilot programs to explore the 
applicability of implementing a Navy wide ERP solution; four were adopted. 
B. CURRENT/LEGACY ERP SYSTEMS 
 A succession of SECNAV’s has reiterated the importance of advanced 
Technology and Business Practices spearheading the DoN’s efforts in reducing costs and 
streamlining processes.  With the end result of these efforts enabling more dollars to be 
shifted to improve naval combat capability and quality of service.  Given the desired end 
state and as mentioned earlier, six programs were recommended to re-engineer business 
processes and implement ERP solutions to cut operating and business costs across 
specific targeted areas within DoN.  Of the six ERP programs, four were commissioned 
and are the legacy systems active in the DoN.  The systems are SMART (targeting 
Aviation Supply Chain), SIGMA (targeting program management), NEMAIS (targeting 
Regional Maintenance), and CABRILLO (targeting Warfare Center Management) and 
are discussed below. 
1. CABRILLO (Navy Working Capital Fund Management “NWCF” 
Pilot Project) 
 CABRILLO went live in July of 2001 at Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (SPAWAR).  The pilot serves 3,500 users and has resulted in over 30 legacy 
business systems being retired at the Systems Support Center (SSC) in San Diego, CA.  
The savings have been dramatic.  The ERP Vendor selected was SAP.  SAP is a German 
based company founded in 1972 and is the recognized leader in providing industry 
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specific, collaborative business solutions.   This program is managed by SSC and the 
system integrator was PriceWaterhouseCoopers (now IBM).  IBM’s team consisted of 
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), Unified Industries Incorporated (UII), SAP, and 
Logicon, Inc.  The NWCF ERP pilot addressed the integration of the following business 
practices and processes: 
¾ Project Management 
¾ Financial Management 
¾ Procurement Management 
¾ Asset Management 
¾ Human Resource Management 
¾ Strategic Planning 
Subsequent experiences led to the incorporation of Business Warehouse and Supplier 
Relationship Management into the production system.  Specific accomplishments 
include: 
¾ Online for 2+ years and stable  
¾ More than 6 million transactions processed  
¾ User acceptance and competence continues to grow  
¾ Civilian End Strength reduction of 15.8 work-years (FY 02)  
¾ Defense Financial Accounting System (DFAS) zero error rate for data  
¾ Contractor reductions = $3.02 million  
¾ Legacy system reduction: retiring 59 of 72 legacy systems,  applications and 
manual processes  
¾ Business cycle time required from requisition to purchase order dropped from 44 
days to 44 minutes for Electronic Catalog buying  
¾ ERP knowledge, as measured by hours of training received: 
Goal = 38,000 hours Achieved = 41,500 hours 







2. NEMAIS (Navy Enterprise Maintenance Automated Information 
 Operational since June of 2002, 
the system is operational in three 
locations (Mid-Atlantic, Southwest, and 
Southeast regions) and will be rolled out 
in Japan and Pascagoula, MS in 2005.  
NEMAIS is a joint partnership between 
NAVSEA (Naval Sea Systems 
Command) and CFFC (Commander Fleet 
Forces Command) targeted to optimize 
Intermediate Level (I-Level) maintenance 
support for the warfighter.  The 
improvement and standardization of 
business processes across I-Level maintenance activities was designed to yield the 
following benefits: 
¾ Commodores, maintenance activity commanders, planners and material managers 
will know the real-time maintenance and material status of ship’s equipment from 
a common information base to better assess current and future readiness. 
¾ Maintenance activity commanders will have real-time indicators of their priorities 
and resources available to maintain the fleet. 
¾ Type Commanders will have improved real-time information to more effectively 
allocate scarce maintenance dollars. 
(ERP Newsletter Issue 1, 2004, P. 4) 
 The efforts were better than expected.  In fact, the re-engineering efforts resulted 
in a 43% reduction in the number of individual processes performed.  This was 
accomplished through the alignment of distinct redundant sub-processes within larger 
separate core processes and through the automation of these processes with the automated 
tools inherent in ERP systems requiring less transfer and verification of information.  
SAP was the ERP vendor for the core software and IBM and its team of partnering 
companies (BearingPoint, Inc. – formerly KPMG Consulting – SAIC/AMSEC, and 
CACI) served as the integration team.  Specific accomplishments include: 
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¾ Online in Mid-Atlantic Region for nearly 2 years and stable; also implemented in 
Southwest and Southeast Regions; SRF Japan “Go Live” scheduled for Summer 
2004  
¾ NEMAIS in January 2003 completed 3 weeks of Independent Third Party Testing, 
which found no material deficiencies during Blue Book review and recommended 
immediate rollout to obtain ROI on retiring 150 legacy systems  
¾ NEMAIS solution is consistent with the Future Logistics Enterprise (FLE) 
Domain Architecture and the Financial Management Enterprise Architecture 
(FMEA), which is now called the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA); 
NEMAIS passed BEA-LOG compliancy certification in May 2003  
¾ NEMAIS integrated data base now includes data from 215 Navy ships (non-
nuclear only)  
¾ More than 76,000 jobs have been inducted into the system, of which more than 
54,000 have been completed  
¾ Material inventory savings achieved from identification, redirection and reduction 
of “gold piles” (unused parts left over from previous jobs)  
¾ 18 military personnel reassigned from administrative and support to direct 
maintenance and repair (production) work (June '02 - June '03 Mid-Atlantic 
Region only)  
¾ Eliminated paper funding documents  
¾ Total actual benefits of NEMAIS in Mid-Atlantic Region, including above = 
$6.33 million  
¾ Legacy system reduction: 3 local unique information systems discontinued to date 
(June '02 - June '03 Mid-Atlantic Region only). NEMAIS is JFMIP compliant, 
capable of replacing hundreds of legacy systems, applications and manual 
processes  
¾ Core processes reduced in number from 203 in legacy to 91 in NEMAIS; support 
processes reduced from 132 in legacy to 112 in NEMAIS  
¾ System automatically prevents over obligation of funds: warning at 85% 
obligation, “All Stop” at 100% obligation  
¾ NEMAIS is a single, common maintenance process fully consistent with 
SHIPMAIN vision of entitlement (CFT1)  
¾ NEMAIS is building the I-Level Master Specification Catalogue (MSC) (CFT2)  
       (ERP Newsletter Issue 1, 2004, P. 4) 
3. SIGMA (Program Management) 
 SIGMA was first implemented in October of 2002.  SIGMA has become the 
system of record for NAVAIR’s Financials, Program Management, Time and 
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Attendance, Awards, Training and Employee Performance Evaluations.  SIGMA 
provides accurate real-time information in one integrated system.  The project 
encompasses a financial system of record for a 23 billion dollar annual budget.  Over 
20,000 users at 10 primary sites and 126 global locations share common processes and 
business rules, a single set of data, and near real-time access to career development and 
training human resources information.  SIGMA is comprised of SAP core software with 
“bolt-on” software packages to handle tasks such as Activity Based Costing, government 
form generation and document management.  SIGMA ERP also interfaces to 18 
mandated legacy DoD and DoN systems.  Specific accomplishments include: 
¾ Operational ~1½ years with more than 19,000 users at 10 primary sites 
and 126 global locations  
¾ Fully operational Disaster Recovery System in place  
¾ Sigma is operated within the NMCI environment  
¾ Retired 51 of 79 planned legacy systems  
¾ Financial system of record for entire $23 billion annual budget  
¾ NAVAIR Travel System is fully integrated with Sigma for Human 
Resources and Financials  
¾ Standard Procurement System (SPS) is fully integrated with Sigma for 
Financials and Procurement  
¾ Financial statements available within 48 hours of period close 
(ERP Newsletter Issue 1, 2004, P. 2) 
4. SMART (Supply Maintenance Aviation Re-engineering Team) 
 First implemented in the fall of 2002 and Sponsored by NAVAIR/ NAVSEA, 
SMART is designed to replace legacy supply, maintenance and financial management 
systems with a modern, responsive, accurate and integrated system.  (Issue 1, 2004, P. 4)  
This pilot has demonstrated improved capabilities in repair turn-around time, Inventory 
management, Data accuracy, and Financial recording and Reports development.  Once 
again the Vendor for the core software was SAP.  Specific accomplishments to date 
include: 
¾ Integrated Supply, Maintenance, Financials in one software suite  
¾ Wholesale and Retail supply in one database, enabling Multi-Echelon 
Sparing  
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¾ Hosting and desktop support within NMCI enclave  
¾ NADEP scheduling, ATP and ICP Repair Planning / Funding 
Collaborative  
¾ CFO Compliant Financials (FMB Blue Book satisfied)  
¾ Ran first-ever Constrained Budget Plan in March 2003, which improved 
supply and maintenance decision-making based on constrained budgets  
¾ Finite (exact date) delivery of spares and repair orders enables 
Availability-to-Promise delivery to customer  
¾ Moving Average Cost of assets incorporated (vs. one price per item)  
¾ FY 03 closeout accomplished within 33 hours 
(ERP Newsletter Issue 1, 2004, P. 4) 
 
C. NAVY ERP CONVERGENCE 
 In January 2003 the decision was made to realign the four pilot programs under 
one Program Management Office (PMO) and to “converge” the four projects into one 
Navy ERP Program.  (Brief, 13 May 2004)  This decision demonstrates the Navy’s 
commitment to conform to a broader enterprise view and will required strong leadership 
and involvement from all stakeholders at all levels of the DON.  In February 2004, five 
Process Councils were formed to direct the process changes required to standardize 
operations Navy-wide and enable the Navy to reap the most benefit from its ERP 
solution.  The Navy will phase out funding in accordance with Table XX with 100% of 
the funding being allocated to the Converged ERP program by FY2009.  They will 
converge the pilot programs into an integrated solution.  From a civilian organizational 
perspective; the Navy went live with 4 divisions of the organization and will now merge 















Figure 11 Legacy/Convergence Transition Funding Plan (From: Stone, 2004, P. 11) 
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 The OPNAV NAPPI  process improvement case study is a good example of how 
process reengineering has been effectively orchestrated within the DoN.  Likewise, while 
not highlighted, the four ERP pilot programs each could have served as strong examples 
of successful change.  Information Technology played a major role in the four programs, 
but little in the NAPPI program.  IT should have been an enabler in the NAPPI program 
but it was not stressed.  This led to large numbers of man hours lost each month to 
generate the monthly inputs required.  Commands fell into the trap of producing the data, 
rather than analyzing the data.  CNAP’s Comptroller recognizes their analysts are 
spending too much time obtaining and maintaining data and not enough time analyzing it.  
This observance and an understanding of the Comptroller’s strategic objective helps 
formulate my recommendations. 
A. CNAP COMPTROLLER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
 On several walls in the CNAP comptroller department their strategic objectives 
are prominently displayed.  These objectives are:  
 
1. Manage force financial resources in the most efficient manner possible to 
ensure that maximum force operational readiness is achieved. 
2. Ensure a coordinated staff effort towards management of resources. 
3. Improve and quantify management to OFC-50 funds to attain a realistic 
budget structure. 
4. Identify force long range and intermediate requirements and factors, and 
integrate into departmental planning operations. 
5. Upgrade/strengthen force financial management through consolidation 
directives, detailing procedures and providing functional guidance. 
6. Enhance quantitative guidelines to measure the efficiency of resource 
utilization. 
7. Maintain a viable “in house” training program. 
(From Photo on CNAP Comptroller Office, 2004) 
 58
B. ERP AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION AT CNAP 
 The CNAP Comptroller Department is as effective as anyone could expect given 
the constrained and dynamic budget environment within which they operate.  After 
gaining an understanding of the FHP/FO funding process and completing the preliminary 
on-site investigation, the following observations were noted: 
¾ Current business practices and processes could be improved upon. 
¾ Comptroller is minimally meeting their Strategic objectives   
¾ There is no documented, trainable, repeatable Budget management As-Is process 
in place  
 As discussed earlier, ERP software attempts to integrate all departments and 
functions across a business onto a single computer system that can serve each 
department’s (or command’s) particular need.  For an enterprise view to be adopted 
successfully at the CNAP level the scope of the enterprise would have to be defined to 
encompass Commander Naval Forces Pacific (CINCPAC) and CNAP’s tenant 
commands (Echelon 2 thru 4) as stakeholders in the reengineering process.  
C. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF ERP FOR CNAP 
 When managing a 3.8 billion dollar budget and 3 colors of money (Air, Ship, and 
Combat /Support Operations) the benefits of an ERP system are undeniable.  This would 
have a tremendous Return on Investment (ROI).  The expected benefits for CNAP are: 
¾ Common processes and business rules as well as a single set of data across the 
Enterprise 
¾ Elimination of redundant processes across accounts 
¾ Eliminate Over-Obligations and obtain zero error rate in obligation of funds  
¾ Quarterly Reconciliation time reductions by orders of magnitude. 
¾ Validate compliance with the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) Act 
¾ Financial statements and FY closeout available within 48 hours of period close  
¾ Reduce civilian end strength.  Far fewer personnel would be required for 
accounting, auditing, and budget analysis. 
¾ Reduced contractor costs in the long term by eliminating legacy systems.  
¾ Improved real-time information to more effectively allocate scarce dollars 
¾ Provides employees near real-time access to their human resources information 
such as career development and training 
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 Each and every one of the listed potential ERP pilot benefits to CNAP is being 
realized in the targeted areas of the four Pilot ERP programs by all the stakeholders 
(SPAWAR, NAVSEA/CFFC, NAVAIR, and NAVSUP).  With the deployment of the 
Global Template Version 1 (the first Navy convergence product) the original 
stakeholders and many more will share in the combined benefits of the pilots.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Comptroller Department is a prime candidate for process re-engineering.  The 
Comptroller Department strongly desires to be more effective and efficient and they 
recognize the benefits of an enterprise wide solution.  This project report can serve as a 
template for further study.  The desired end state is to provide the CNAP Comptroller 
Department with a roadmap and a template to successful management of their assets 
(personnel), resources (information technology, unit knowledge), in order to better meet 
their seven strategic objectives. The following course of action is recommended:  
1. Conduct personal interviews to get a full understanding of how the department is 
aligned.  Better organizational alignment will help ensure everyone’s efforts are 
focused on work relevant to core strategic objectives of the department. 
2. Develop a detailed process map that defines the optimal use of departmental 
resources.  This will build upon the initial research conducted. 
3. Define an agreed upon metric to track departmental effectiveness at meeting core 
strategic objectives of the department.  (one example might be the obligation rate 
contained in the Fund Status Report). 
4. Make recommendations regarding information technology’s role in meeting the 
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